usatvline Chapter 769: Clearance Operation Outer Okinawa Island
Chapter 769: Clearance Operation Outer Okinawa Island
According to the combat plan formulated by Admiral Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Theater, Spruance and Mitchell led the 58th Task Force of the United States Navy, and launched a fierce air raid on Japan's Okinawa Island on March 1, 1945 on their way back from bombing the Japanese mainland during the Battle of Iwo Jima. They also conducted aerial reconnaissance and aerial photography of Okinawa Island, Kerama Islands and Amami Oshima, providing first-hand information for the United States' offensive forces before the Battle of Okinawa.
As for the bombing of the Japanese mainland air base by the United States Army, because the Saipan bomber base of the United States Army was more than 29 nautical miles away, only aircraft carriers and B-29 heavy bombers could reach it. As the aircraft carrier formation had been fighting at sea for many days and had to take on the important task of sea and air cover in the upcoming landing on Okinawa Island, it urgently needed to rest before the battle began. The B- heavy bombers were all under the command of the Strategic Air Force of the United States Army Aviation.
Therefore, Admiral Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Theater, asked Admiral Arnold, Commander of the U.S. Army Air Force, for assistance in bombing. However, Admiral Arnold, Commander of the U.S. Army Air Force, believed that this was a purely tactical mission and was unwilling to dispatch precious B-29 heavy bombers.
As a result, Admiral Nimitz, commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Theater, and Admiral Arnold, commander of the U.S. Army Air Force, each held their own views, and neither side gave in in the dispute.
On the one hand, Admiral Nimitz, commander-in-chief of the United States Pacific Theater, said that the United States naval forces suffered heavy casualties in the bloody battle on Iwo Jima, all in order to gain a forward base for the strategic bombers of the United States Army Air Force.
On the other hand, Admiral Nimitz, commander-in-chief of the Pacific Theater of the United States, argued that the "Strategic Air Charter" stipulated that the theater commander-in-chief had the right to use strategic bombers in an emergency. This forced Admiral Arnold, commander of the U.S. Army Air Force, to make concessions and agree to use the B-29 heavy bomber for bombing operations against aircraft manufacturing plants and air bases in Japan.
Starting from March 29, 29, in order to improve the bombing effect of the U.S. Air Force on Japan's military industry, Major General LeMay, commander of the U.S. th Air Force, changed the original daytime high-altitude precision bombing tactics to nighttime low-altitude bombing, and removed all onboard weapons except the tail gun from the B- heavy bomber, thus increasing the bomb load of the B- heavy bomber to seven tons.
Moreover, Major General LeMay, commander of the 29th Air Force of the United States, ordered all B- heavy bombers bombing the Japanese mainland to use incendiary bombs. This tactic was called "LeMay's Bet" or "LeMay's Fire Attack."
That night, 29 B- heavy bombers from the United States dropped tons of incendiary bombs on Tokyo, Japan, turning the square kilometers of Tokyo into ruins, destroying buildings, leaving more than one million people homeless, killing civilians, and injuring .
Subsequently, Major General LeMay, commander of the 29th Air Force of the United States, organized large-scale bombings of Japanese cities such as Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe using the same tactics. As of March , , the U.S. Army Air Force had dispatched more than B- heavy bombers and dropped nearly tons of incendiary bombs, forcing the Japanese government to evacuate the aircraft manufacturing plants in these cities, greatly reducing the production of Japanese aircraft.
On March 27 and 31, 1945, the United States 20th Air Force, at the request of Admiral Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Theater, began bombing Japanese airfields on Kyushu Island, Japan. This caused serious damage to the Japanese facilities at these airports and almost paralyzed the Japanese air force in the Kyushu area.
At the same time, the mine-laying offensive organized by the U.S. Navy completely blocked Japan's Shimonoseki Strait. These bombing operations by the U.S. military's strategic air force seriously hindered the Japanese navy and air force's reinforcement of Okinawa Island, creating extremely favorable conditions for the Battle of Okinawa.
In order to completely eliminate the air threat from the Japanese mainland, Admiral Nimitz, commander-in-chief of the United States Pacific Theater, ordered the 58th Task Force, the main aircraft carrier formation of the United States Navy's Fifth Fleet, to attack the Japanese mainland from Ulithi Naval Base on March 14, 1945, under the command of Lieutenant General Mitchell, commander of the 58th Task Force of the United States Navy. After a short rest of ten days, the order was sent out from Ulithi Naval Base on March 14, 1945.
On the night of March 17, 1945, the 58th Task Force of the United States Navy was discovered by a Japanese reconnaissance aircraft.
As for the actions of the 58th Task Force of the United States Navy, there were two different opinions within the Japanese Military Headquarters. Some people in the Japanese Military Headquarters believed that the actions of the United States Navy were advance aviation firepower preparation for landing on Okinawa Island, and that troops should be organized quickly to counterattack.
Another part of the Japanese military headquarters believed that a counterattack should be organized after the American offensive forces began to land on Okinawa Island. They should not attack rashly when the situation is not clear, so as to avoid causing unnecessary losses to the Japanese army.
Finally, the Japanese military headquarters took into account that the Japanese air force suffered serious losses and the new Japanese air forces were undergoing intensive training. Even if these new Japanese air forces trained for one more day, it would be beneficial to the Japanese army's subsequent operations. Therefore, the Japanese military headquarters ordered that as long as there were no obvious signs of landing operations by the American offensive forces, the air force should not be used as much as possible, with the priority of preserving strength.
On March 18, 1945, the 58th Task Force of the United States Navy arrived at a place about 90 nautical miles southeast of Kyushu, Japan. Starting from the early morning of that day, the 58th Task Force of the United States Navy dispatched carrier-based aircraft to bomb various airports in Kyushu, Japan.
Although Vice Admiral Uehara, commander of the Japanese Navy's Fifth Air Fleet, received an order from the Japanese military headquarters to wait for the landing formation of the American offensive force to appear before attacking.
However, Vice Admiral Uehara, commander of the Fifth Air Fleet of the Japanese Navy, believed that if they did not counterattack the American Navy now and allowed American planes to bomb indiscriminately, their own air forces would be destroyed on the ground by American planes.
Therefore, Vice Admiral Uehara, commander of the Japanese Navy's Fifth Air Fleet, ignored the orders from the Japanese military headquarters and ordered Japanese planes to start attacking.
As a result, the Japanese planes and the American planes crossed each other in the air. When the American planes came over Kyushu, they only encountered some slight resistance, but the planes at the Japanese airport all flew away, which made the results of the bombing by the American planes very limited.